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T. M. Scanlon 
 
Michael Walzer’s work in political philosophy, from Obligations through Just 
and Unjust Wars and Interpretation and Social Criticism to Spheres of Justice, is a 
marvelously rich vein of ideas and insights, which I find myself returning to time and 
time again. In these remarks I will focus on the conception of equality that Walzer 
defends in Spheres of Justice, and on its relation to the pluralistic conception of equality 
that I myself have been led to, partly under his influence. 
Spheres of Justice includes three main themes, which it is useful to distinguish. 
The first theme, Complex Equality, holds that different standards of distribution are 
appropriate for different goods. These standards do not always require equal distribution. 
The standards appropriate to the distribution of educational resources, for example, may 
require different individuals to be treated differently, and to receive different kinds of 
education depending on their differing needs and talents. Such inequalities in the 
distribution of a good are not even prima facie objectionable, and do not need to be 
balanced by compensating inequalities in other goods. This is in contrast to what Walzer 
calls a doctrine of simple equality, which would require equality in overall welfare, for 
example, or in some basket of primary social goods.  
According to complex equality, injustice occurs when either the distribution of a 
given good is not in accord with the standards appropriate for that good or if the 
distribution of one good brings with it a distribution of some other good that is not in 
accord with the standards for that good. So, for example, a distribution of educational 
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opportunities would be unjust on the latter ground if it led to objectionable inequality of 
income, or of political power.  
The second theme, the Meaning Dependence of Distributive Standards, holds that 
the standard of just distribution for a good is determined by the meaning of that good. At 
least part of what this comes to is that the criteria of just distribution of a good are 
determined by what it is that makes that good a good, i.e. something that people have 
reason to want. For example, to identify the proper criteria for the distribution of 
educational resources we should consider what makes education something that people 
should want to have and that the society should want to provide. These will include such 
things as self-development, economic opportunity, and participation in civic life. The 
distribution of education should then be determined by what different individuals need 
and can use to achieve these things. This may require giving different kinds and amounts 
of education to different individuals. 
The third theme is the Social Dependence of Meanings. This holds that the 
meaning of a good, which determines its just distribution in a society, is the meaning it 
has within the culture of that society. Meaning in this sense can vary from society to 
society, and it follows from the themes previously mentioned that when the meaning of a 
good varies the standards of just distribution vary with it. This relativist strand in the 
theory attracted much attention and criticism when Spheres of Justice first appeared. But 
it seems very plausible in some cases. The kind of education that is needed for 
“intellectual self-development,” for example, may vary from one society to another 
depending on the larger intellectual life of that society. In some cases the kind of 
intellectual activity that is available may require one to be proficient in Latin, in which 
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case education in Latin has a degree of importance that it would not have in another 
society in which Latin was an arcane interest. Similarly, societies vary in whether fluency 
in Latin is or is not necessary for participation in public life. In a society in which it is 
not, there might be no objection to having education in Latin available only to the 
children of the rich. But this would be objectionable if all public political debates were 
conducted in Latin, since this distribution of educational opportunity would then bring 
with it an inequality in political power. This much seems very plausible, even 
uncontroversial. 
But, a strict reading of the Social Dependence of Meanings also implies that an 
unequal distribution of political power is (in itself) unjust only if it is contrary to the 
meaning that political power has in the society in question. If, for example, political 
power is seen in a certain society as the prerogative of a certain class, then distribution of 
political power only to that class would not be unjust according to Walzer’s view. 
This implication may seem implausible (indeed, it does to me), and worries of this 
sort, about the relativistic implications of the Social Dependence of Meanings, dominated 
much of the discussion of Spheres of Justice when it first appeared. The doctrine of 
Complex Equality, however, is much more plausible and appealing. So I will set aside the 
question of relativism for the moment, and focus instead of the idea of separate spheres of 
distribution. Specifically, I shall consider whether the idea of separate spheres of 
distribution, defined by the social meanings of the relevant different goods, is the best 
way of understanding a complex, or pluralistic, conception of equality. 
An essential feature of demands for equality is their comparative character. Not 
every view that takes individuals to be morally equal is comparative in this way. So not 
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every such view is egalitarian. According to Robert Nozick’s view in Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia, for example, individuals are morally equal in that they have the same rights. But 
these rights are non-comparative. In order to know whether someone’s rights are being 
violated it is enough to know what has been done to him or her. It is not necessary to 
know how others have been treated. A demand for equality, on the other hand, is a 
demand to be treated in the same way as others—to have the same income as they do, or 
the same level of social services. Such a demand can in principle be met by giving them 
less as well as by giving you more, and it is this concern with what others have—this 
potential for “dog in the manger” demands for leveling down—that makes equality 
controversial. This comparative character is what gives rise to the suspicion that demands 
for equality, as opposed to demands simply to be made better off in some material 
respect, are mere expressions of envy. As Walzer observes, one of the main tasks of an 
egalitarian theory of justice is to answer this charge.1 I am drawn to a pluralistic 
conception of equality in large part because of its ability to provide such answers. What I 
want to do now is to consider some of these answers, as I would give them, and to see 
how they correspond to the answers that would be provided by the doctrine of complex 
equality set out in Spheres of Justice.2 
In order to answer the charge that genuinely comparative demands for equality are 
mere expressions of envy we need to provide some convincing reason for objecting not 
just to the level of some individuals’ enjoyment of a good but to the difference between 
                                                
1 Spheres of Justice, p. xiii. 
2 The plural conception of equality that lies behind what I will say in the rest of this paper 
draws on my essay, “The Diversity of Objections to Inequality,” in The Difficulty of 
Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003) and “When Does Equality Matter” (unpublished.) 
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this level and that of others. One way of doing this is expressed in what I call the 
principle of equal benefit. If an agent, say the state, has an obligation to provide a certain 
benefit to each member of a group, then it is objectionable if, absent some justification, it 
provides this benefit more fully to some than to others. Suppose, for example, that the 
state is obligated to provide paved streets, or trash collection, to all citizens. It may be 
permissible for these benefits to be provided at any or several levels: the legislature can 
decide how much to spend on repaving, or on frequent and convenient trash pickups, and 
how much to spend on other things. But it would be prima facie unjust consistently to 
provide better streets, or better garbage collection services to one neighborhood (say that 
occupied by members of a particular religion or ethnic group) than is provided to another. 
The underlying obligation in such cases—to provide a certain benefit—is not 
comparative. But when that obligation exists, its differential fulfillment is unjust. 
I want now to consider how this objection to inequality might be explained within 
the theory advanced in Spheres of Justice. The requirement of equal treatment that I have 
described may seem independent of social meanings. But that appearance may be 
deceiving. First, what constitutes equal treatment may depend on the social meaning of 
the good in question. This may not be obvious in the case of streets and garbage pickups, 
but it becomes clearer when we consider goods such as education. As I pointed out 
earlier, the obligation to provide education to all may require providing quite different 
things to different people, depending on their needs and talents. As was also pointed out, 
this obligation can justifiably take different forms in different societies depending on 
differences in what people need education for, and how they are able to use it. 
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The view put forward in Spheres of Justice goes further, and holds that what I 
have been calling obligations to provide certain goods are themselves a component of the 
“social meaning” of those goods, and therefore socially relative. This seems true in many 
cases. At least within a certain range, it is open to a society to decide which services the 
state will provide for its citizens—whether, for example, it will provide a system of 
public transportation or leave this to private initiative. But once the state does take up a 
given role, the principle of equal benefit applies. On Walzer’s view, then, there is no need 
to refer to a special wrong of “unequal treatment” or “differential fulfillment of an 
obligation” to explain what is unjust in cases of unequal benefit of the kind I have been 
imagining. They are just cases in which some good—education, or garbage collection, as 
it might be—is being distributed in some way other than in accord with its social 
meaning.3 
I turn now to some other grounds for objecting to inequality, and to how these 
objections look from the point of view of Spheres of Justice. One such objection appeals 
to the fact that people have good reason to object to social arrangements that mark them 
out as inferior to others. This may be only a prima facie objection—some social 
judgments of inferiority may be justified. It may be justified, for example, to deny certain 
signs of social respect to those who have committed terrible crimes against their fellow 
citizens. But the experience of being unjustifiably stigmatized as inferior is something 
that people have good reason to want to avoid. 
                                                
3 I leave aside the question whether there are some obligations that belong to the state qua 
state, independent of local views of the matter. Police protection and protection against 
foreign aggression, for example, may to fall into this category. I leave it open how much 




This provides one important objection to familiar forms of racial discrimination, 
and also, I would say, to caste societies, which mark some people as ineligible for 
important social goods simply on the basis of birth. The possibility that in a caste society 
such treatment might be justified by a coherent set of social meanings (a possibility that 
Walzer discusses4) raises the question of relativism, mentioned above. As I would see it, 
the very coherence of this set of meanings makes the evil of being condemned as inferior 
in such a society worse. But I will leave this question aside for the moment, because I 
want to consider another objection to inequality based on the evil of unequal status. 
Objectionable inequalities in status can be produced simply by extreme forms of 
economic inequality. As Adam Smith observed, there is a serious objection to a society in 
which some people are so much poorer than others that they have to live and dress in 
such a way that they cannot go out in public without shame.5 In Walzer’s version of 
complex equality this objection might be put by saying that in such a society one 
“sphere”—that of income and wealth—is allowed to dominate another sphere—that on 
honor, or recognition. Whether this is the best way of putting the matter or not, the 
objection is a sound one. 
This objection allows us to see the superiority of a doctrine of complex equality 
over some forms of simple equality. Consider an abstract description of two societies.6 In 
both of these societies the great majority of citizens enjoy the same level of welfare, 
which we can assume is quite a tolerable level. In one society, however, (call it Peakville) 
                                                
4 Spheres of Justice, Chapter 13. 
5 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: 
Home University, 1910) pp. 351-352. Cited by Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992) p. 115. 
6 This example was suggested to me by Larry Temkin’s discussion in Inequality (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), Chapter 2, although his examples differ from this one. 
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there are a very few people who are much, much better off. In the other society, 
(Valleyland) there is a group, of the same size, of people who are much, much worse off 
than the majority. Following Temkin, we may ask whether one of these societies is worse 
than the other “from the point of view of equality” or whether they are the same, judged 
from this point of view. In one sense, they are the same: they have the same Gini 
coefficient, for example. But there is one obvious objection to Valleyland, the society 
with a small number of (relatively) poor citizens, that does not apply to Peakville: the 
objection that the poorer citizens of Valleyland are likely to suffer status harm of the kind 
described by Adam Smith. 
To assess the inequality in Peakville, on the other hand, we need to know more 
than my abstract description tells us. If the very wealthy citizens consist of film stars or 
athletes whose relative wealth derives from the eagerness of their fans to see them 
perform, this wealth might be unobjectionable “from the point of view of equality”—that 
is to say, it may not, in itself, give rise to any claim of injustice against the society. If this 
inequality has no other objectionable effects, then this might be a case in which 
inequality in income is, as Walzer says, “harmless.”7 But things are quite different if the 
small number of well-to-do people, whatever the source of their wealth, are able to 
control the lives of others by, for example, determining what kinds of employment will 
be available for them. So a second way in which inequality can be objectionable is that it 
can allow some people to dominate and control others. 
In the language of Spheres of Justice this might be seen as a case in which one 
sphere of distribution inappropriately dominates another: a case in which the good of 
                                                
7 Spheres of Justice, p. 107. 
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wealth tyrannizes over the good of power, or liberty.  This does not seem to me the best 
way of putting the matter, however. The natural objection to such arrangements does not 
derive from a particular social meaning of the good of liberty, or the good of power, but 
rather from the fact that, whatever the social meanings of the goods of their society, 
people have good reason to want not to be controlled in this way. So in this case I am 
inclined to accept the doctrine of Complex Equality but to resist the doctrine of the 
Meaning Dependence of Distributive Standards, or at least to resist the combination of 
this doctrine with the Social Dependence of Meanings. 
Another way in which inequalities can be objectionable, I would say, is by 
undermining the fairness of basic social institutions. Here are two familiar examples. 
First, when there is great inequality in family income and wealth, individuals’ prospects 
of success in a competitive market are greatly affected by the families into which they are 
born. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve equality of economic 
opportunity. Second, great inequalities in wealth and income can undermine the fairness 
of political institutions. The wealthy may be much more able than others to gain political 
office themselves, much more able to influence others who hold office, who must be 
dependent on them for contributions, and much more able to influence the course of 
political debate and legislation. 
It is an open empirical question what degree of economic equality is required by 
this argument—how much inequality is compatible, in a given society, with the fairness 
of economic and political institutions. Strict equality of income and wealth is probably 
not required. What is required is that even the poorer members of society have sufficient 
resources to compete, economically and politically, with their richer fellow citizens. 
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Perhaps, given the right kind of public education and the right organization of political 
campaigns, certain differences in income and wealth would not be harmful in this 
particular way. What we do know is that if there is such a combination of remedies that 
would be adequate for the levels of inequality that prevail in our society, we have not 
found it. The requirements of fairness are very difficult to satisfy with anything like the 
levels of income disparity that we are familiar with. 
As I have stated it, this objection to economic inequality is that it undermines the 
fairness of economic and political institutions. If we were to adhere to the doctrines of 
Spheres of Justice, the objection would need to be put instead by saying that these cases 
were cases in which one good—wealth—dominates another—say, political power, or 
economic opportunity (or perhaps the goods represented by certain positions to which 
economic reward is attached.) The objection would be that economic inequality caused 
these goods to be distributed in some way other than the way required by their own social 
meanings. Is this a satisfactory way of putting the point? 
One reason not to put it this way is that the objection to inequality that we are 
considering (the objection I stated in terms of fairness) would seem to be just as strong if 
the accepted view in the society in question was that political power properly belonged to 
the rich, and that the poor had no claim to it. From the point of view of fairness, as I am 
understanding it, this attitude—this social meaning—is objectionable in itself. On this 
view there would be an objection, from the point of view of equality, to reserving 
positions of political power for members of any group—a race or clan or religion, for 
example, whether or not this was brought about by one good, such as wealth, dominating 
 11 
another. As in the case of a caste society, it seems that such a way of understanding the 
social meaning of political power would be open to direct criticism as unjust. 
But this divergence between a “universalist” standard of criticism and a purely 
“local” one may be exaggerated. One way of narrowing it would be to note that any 
“social meaning” that we could recognize as a meaning of the good of political power 
would have to include the idea of an entitlement to issue edicts that citizens are obligated 
to obey—that is, that they have compelling reason to see as authoritative. And it might be 
argued that any social meaning that included this idea would contain within it a basis for 
objecting to, say, oligarchic, or class-based rule. Those outside the privileged class could 
reasonably ask: why should we obey them? Of course the reigning ideas in a society (a 
caste society, for example) could provide some answer to this question. What “localists” 
and “universalists” may disagree about at this point, I suppose, is what determines 
whether this answer is or is not a good one. Is this determined ultimately by whether that 
answer is supported by what is generally accepted in that society? 
There may, however, be some advantage in looking at this issue in terms of social 
meanings. To see this we need to consider how the requirements of economic and 
political fairness are to be formulated and defended. These requirements come in formal 
and substantive varieties. Formally speaking, political fairness requires that all citizens 
have the same political rights: equal rights to vote, equal rights to speak, to run for office, 
and so on. Substantively, there is a further question of what they are able do with these 
rights: how effectively they can use them to gain public office or influence the course of 
political events. Similarly, formal equality of economic opportunity is achieved if all 
have the same rights to participate in the market, and if candidates for positions to which 
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special rewards are attached are judged on their qualifications for those jobs, without 
discrimination, nepotism and so on. Substantive equality of economic opportunity goes 
beyond this, and requires that individuals who have the underlying talent have a proper 
chance to develop these talents into actual qualifications for positions of advantage. Fair 
equality of opportunity, as Rawls famously puts it, requires that 
those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same 
willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of 
their initial place in the social system.8 
When I said, above, that economic inequality can be objectionable because it conflicts 
with the fairness of economic and political institutions, the conflict I had in mind was 
with the substantive versions of these requirements. Given that these substantive 
requirements are, as I have said, extremely difficult to satisfy, it is worth asking how they 
are to be defended. Despite (or perhaps because of) the nearly universal lip service paid 
to these requirements (especially to the idea of equal economic opportunity) on the right 
at least as much as on the left, there is little discussion of this question of justification. So 
I want to consider briefly what kind of justification might be offered, and in particular 
whether a “social meaning” account may have something distinctive to contribute in this 
regard. 
In the political case, the justification for substantive equality is relatively 
straightforward. If a political process is to issue in laws that all citizens are obligated to 
obey, then they need to have a role in shaping these laws, and this role is not guaranteed 
simply by formal equality. It requires meaningful opportunity to participate in the 
                                                
8 A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 73. 
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political process. As I indicated above, this justification can naturally be stated in terms 
of the social meaning of power (although I expressed some doubts about that 
justification.) 
In the economic case, the justification for equality of opportunity is not as 
immediate. Consider first the justification for formal equality of economic opportunity, 
which requires that everyone be legally entitled to participate in the economy and that 
candidates for jobs should be considered on the basis of their job-related qualifications. 
Here we can argue that if the justification for having a position to which special 
privileges or rewards are attached is based on the advantages that this specialization 
brings to the institution in question, or the economy as a whole, then a hiring officer who 
hires people on some basis other than job-related qualifications is misusing his or her 
authority. This rules out not only such things as racial discrimination but also nepotism 
and simply failing to take the relative qualifications of applicants into account because it 
would be too much work to read their dossiers. 
This is, so far, a “top down” justification for equal treatment—that is, it derives 
ultimately from the needs of and justification for the institutional arrangements in 
question, including the positions of unequal reward that they involve. Claims of 
individual applicants to “equal consideration” are, on this account, derivative from this 
justification. If, in the case of racial discrimination for example, there is a further harm 
that individuals have a claim against, this has to be explained on some other basis, such 
as the one I described above in discussing objections to inequality of status. 
The top-down justification for formal equality that I have just given fits well with 
the doctrine of complex equality, since it could be put by saying that it is part of the 
 14 
“social meaning” of certain positions that they should go to people with certain 
qualifications. Indeed, what I have said here tracks fairly closely what Walzer says in 
Chapter 5 of Spheres of Justice, in particular his remark that equality of opportunity 
applies to all careers that have been turned into “offices.”  
The question is whether and how this justification for formal equality of economic 
opportunity (in either of the two versions I have described) could be extended to cover 
substantive equality of opportunity as well. (For example, whether it could be extended to 
provide a justification for Rawls’s requirement of Fair Equality of Opportunity.) This is a 
serious question because, as I have said, such substantive requirements are difficult and 
costly to fulfill. Insofar as the “top down” argument for formal equality of opportunity 
appeals, at its base, to what is needed to make certain institutions function well, it may 
seem to support only a qualified case for substantive equality of opportunity. Achieving 
Fair Equality of Opportunity might improve the functioning of these institutions by 
increasing the size and perhaps the quality of the pool of qualified applicants. But if the 
guiding aim is simply that of improved institutional functioning, there is always the 
question of how much the increased efficiency of these institutions is worth, and whether 
it justifies the sacrifice of other goods. The point of diminishing returns might be reached 
before anything like Fair Equality of Opportunity is attained. 
Within the view advanced in Spheres of Justice, we might bridge the gap between 
formal and substantive equality if we could argue that the social meaning of the “offices” 
in question not only requires that they be assigned to the best qualified applicants, but 
also that these offices should go to those members of society who have the greatest 
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underlying talent for such positions. (This would be parallel to the argument for 
substantive equality in the political case.) 
I am not sure how plausible it is to claim this. An alternative argument, which 
seems to me more plausible, would be based not on the “meaning” of the offices in 
question but on that of the forms of education required to develop qualifications for these 
offices. The idea would be that, where offices of this kind exist, the forms of education 
required to develop qualification for them is a good whose meaning is that it should be 
distributed on the basis of native talent rather than, say, by the market. Of course, taking 
seriously the Social Dependence of Meanings, it must be recognized that this argument 
would apply only in those societies in which the goods of office had this particular 
meaning. 
Stepping outside of Walzer’s framework, we might develop a parallel argument 
appealing to what I called above the principle of equal benefit. This argument would be 
that where positions exist that require special qualification and bring special benefit 
(monetary benefit, perhaps, and also the non-monetary benefit of interesting work and the 
good of exercising a developed talent), the state has an obligation to provide the kind of 
education necessary to develop these qualifications. Given that this is so, it must be made 
available equally to all who have the requisite talent, regardless of their social class, etc. 
Some further argument is needed for the claim that this particular good is one that the 
state is obligated to provide. But it seems to me at present that a “two-stage” argument of 
this kind offers a plausible way of stating the case for substantive equality of economic 
opportunity. (I call it a “two stage” argument because it does not claim that substantive 
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equality of opportunity is a condition on the justness of the offices in question, as Rawls 
seems to do in stating his requirement of Fair Equality of Opportunity.) 
I believe that the objections to inequality that I have so far mentioned, which have 
close links to Complex Equality even though they do not coincide with it, account for 
most of the arguments for greater inequality that one encounters in ordinary political 
life—certainly for the most powerful such arguments. They do not, however, bring us to 
anything like a strict doctrine of the kind Walzer called simple equality—a doctrine 
requiring equal levels of welfare for all citizens, or for distributions of all goods that 
satisfy what Ronald Dworkin calls the envy test (that no one should prefer anyone else’s 
bundle of goods to his or her own.) So it is reasonable to ask whether we have overlooked 
some objection to inequality that might lead one to such a view.  
One might derive a general requirement of equal welfare from the principle of 
equal benefit by beginning with the idea that the state has a general obligation to provide 
for the overall welfare of its citizens—not just to protect them and provide certain 
services but to increase their overall level of well being or preference satisfaction. It 
would then follow, from the principle of equal benefit that the state must fulfill this 
obligation equally with respect to all of its citizens. Perhaps some welfare egalitarians 
hold such a view, but I myself do not find the idea that the state has an obligation to 
promote overall welfare a very plausible starting point, so I will leave this argument 
aside. 
Neither Dworkin nor Rawls starts from this premise. The rationale for their 
egalitarianism seems to lie rather in ideas of what I will call equal claim to resources. In 
Dworkin’s case the rationale for his mythical auction is that the participants have all 
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arrived on an uninhabited island at the same time, and have the same claims to its 
resources.9 In Rawls’s case, the parties to his Original Position are representatives of the 
cooperating members of a society, that is to say, the members whose cooperation 
produces the goods the just division of which is in question. It is in virtue of this role that 
they have a claim on the goods in question, and their symmetrical position in the Original 
Position reflects the fact that they are assumed to have an equal claim. 
To support this claim of equality in an actual society, one would need to defend 
the idea that its citizens, as co-producers, have equal claims to the fruits of their 
cooperation, and this claim might be questioned. It might be claimed that the 
contributions of different citizens are not equal, and that their shares should reflect this, 
perhaps by being divided according to their marginal contributions. Rawls attempts to 
rebut such objections at various points in A Theory of Justice.10 Assuming this can be 
done successfully, the form of substantive equality that this argument naturally leads to is 
equality of resources—equality in primary social goods, as opposed, say, to equality of 
welfare, which would be more plausible if one were proceeding from the principle of 
equal benefit in the way I briefly described above.  
In closing, want to consider what the accounts of equality that I have been 
discussing have to say about the increasing inequality in our society. This has two 
aspects. The first is the plight of the very poor, who may be without employment, or even 
the prospect of it, without proper health care, and perhaps even without adequate housing. 
Any of the views I have been considering would support strong objections to this 
situation. What I want to focus on, however, is what these views have to say about the 
                                                
9 See Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000) pp. 66ff. 
10 See, for example, §§47-49. 
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other aspect of contemporary rising inequality, namely the widening gap between the 
super rich and the rest of us. As Paul Krugman has written,  
Over the past 30 years most people have seen only modest salary increases: the 
average annual salary in America, expressed in 1998 dollars (that is, adjusted for 
inflation), rose from $32,522 in 1970 to $35,864 in 1999. That's about a 10 
percent increase over 29 years -- progress, but not much. Over the same period, 
however, according to Fortune magazine, the average real annual compensation of 
the top 100 C.E.O.'s went from $1.3 million -- 39 times the pay of an average 
worker -- to $37.5 million, more than 1,000 times the pay of ordinary workers.”11 
Since Krugman wrote these words five years ago, the phenomenon he was describing has 
grown more extreme. It seems quite widely agreed that, as Krugman’s tone implies, there 
is something objectionable about this, and it seems to be widely thought to be 
objectionable because of the inequality involved. The question is why this is so. 
Even if this class of super rich people may live in a style very different from the 
rest of us, this does not give us grounds for feeling humiliated, or inferior, or ashamed of 
our more modest ways of life. So inequality of status is not the main issue. We might say 
instead that this level of inequality is objectionable because it will, at least over time, 
undermine equality of opportunity, and also because it gives these people unacceptable 
political power in the form of ability to buy influence by giving large contributions to 
political candidates and parties. These things may well be true. But I doubt that they 
support the thought that there is something particularly objectionable about recent 
increases in inequality resulting from higher levels of executive compensation. Equality 
                                                
11 New York Times Magazine, October 20, 2003 
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of opportunity was seriously undermined by the much smaller differences in income and 
wealth that existed at the beginning of the period Krugman describes, and increases in the 
incomes of the rich since that time do not seem to make that situation worse—there is a 
limit to the amount of money you can spend to give your children a leg up. Worries that 
these increases in inequality undermine political fairness may be more germane, but, 
again, this does not seem anything new. 
One possible response would be to say that insofar as even extreme inequalities 
did not give rise to the problems I have listed—problems of status, domination, or harms 
to the fairness of political and economic institutions—there would be no objection to 
them purely on grounds of inequality: when they do not have these costs, inequality in 
income and wealth have been rendered “harmless.” This may be the view that people take 
of inequality created by the wealth of entertainment and sports figures. But there seems to 
be something more objectionable in the case of C.E.O.s. 
One possible ground for this might be the thought that these executives are 
gaining something they do not deserve at the expense of the workers in their firms. The 
underlying idea might then be something like Rawls’s assumption about the (equal, or at 
least not grossly unequal) claims of those whose cooperation goes into producing a good. 
This may be part of it, but we do not have similar feelings about the relation between the 
income of film stars and that of the grips and best boys who are listed in the credits at the 
end (not to mention the truck drivers and so on who are not even listed.) Perhaps we 
should have such feelings. But I want to conclude by offering a different explanation that 
would separate these cases to some degree. 
 20 
This is an objection to the pay of some C.E.O.s that is not an objection to 
inequality per se, but rather to the process that yields it. Film stars and sports figures are 
at least earning their pay in what appears to be a genuinely competitive market. The 
compensation packages of C.E.O.s, on the other hand, are set by compensation 
committees, composed, one may imagine, of other C.E.O’s who are their friends or who 
at least are driven by some shared idea of what people like them should be paid, rather 
than by pure market factors. As Walzer says, the gross inequalities that we see around us 
“derive more significantly from status hierarchies, organizational structures, and power 
relationships than from the free market.”12 They are thus instances of what he calls the 
domination of one sphere by another, and therefore unjust on his account. This is 
certainly one reason why these inequalities are objectionable. Whether there is a further 
objection to these inequalities qua inequalities, beyond the objections I have so far 







                                                
12 Spheres of Justice, p. 117. 
